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Abstract 
This article examines recent trends in EU refugee law. It argues that within the EU 
there is a complex and technical set of rules and procedures that maintain the 
refugee in a position where protection can be easily denied or revoked. Engaging with 
the work of Judith Butler, I argue that this constant threat of removal exists on a 
‘continuum of precariousness’. Mapping a number of EU legal practices, I argue that 
the EU has expanded this precariousness in order to manage the movement of 
people, transforming laws, which were ostensibly for the protection of persecuted 
people, into a form of post hoc immigration control. I track how this process is 
deeply rooted in bureaucratic practices, which construct place, space and attachment 
through the law. 
1. Introduction 
In 2016, the EU announced an arrangement that significantly impacted on its refugee 
policy. Under the arrangement, ‘all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into 
Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey.’1 Under the scheme, 
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 [Author’s affiliation] 
1
 Council of the EU, ‘EU Turkey Statement, March 2016’, Press Release 144/16 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/pdf> accessed 06 
September 2018. . 
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the EU resettles a Syrian from Turkey to the EU for every Syrian returned to Turkey 
from the Greek Islands. The Syrians who are returned to Turkey are those deemed by 
Greece to have unfounded asylum claims. However, given the longstanding critique 
of the quality of Greece’s refugee status determination(RSD) process, the scheme will 
likely enable the EU to deflect responsibility for those seeking international 
protection.   
Under the scheme, Turkey is treated as if it is a ‘safe third country’ (STC). A STC is 
usually defined as a state an asylum seeker has passed through on her way to another 
state where she could have applied for asylum.  Turkey however, is not bound by EU 
legislation establishing minimum or common standards of treatment of asylum 
seekers and refugees. The EU has therefore chosen to ignore the risks associated with 
such returns, in the pursuit of a more ‘efficient’ asylum system.  
The scheme has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny, described as an illegal 
measure that flies in the face of the rules of the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS).2 However, in this article I argue that the deal can only be understood in the 
context of a longer-term project in which the EU has sought to place refugees and 
asylum seekers outside its jurisdiction, in both a physical and legal sense.    
I argue that the EU has created a series of precarious legal statuses, under which 
refugees and asylum seekers are constantly at threat of removal. This precariousness 
exists even after the formal acquisition of legal status and so forms what I call a 
continuum of precariousness. This sense of ‘removability’ begins with the initial 
uncertainty as to whether refugee status will be granted and persists even after 
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  See for example, S Peers, ‘The final EU/Turkey refugee deal: a legal assessment’, (EU Law Analysis, 18 
March 2016) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html> 
accessed 09 May 2017. 
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protection status has been secured. The granting of protection status therefore does 
not signal a shift to a more secure status, but to a new form of precarity.  
The concept of the STC rests on an idea of ‘safety elsewhere’.  In this argument, the 
role of the EU is not to take in refugees, but rather guarantee their ‘safety’, whether 
inside or outside the EU. In this way, safety elsewhere speaks to the ‘returnability’ of 
the refugee, either directly to her country of origin, or indirectly to a third country. 
By evoking the idea of safety elsewhere, greater emphasis is placed on keeping the 
refugee outside the EU. This is also presented as a necessary part of protecting the 
immigration system from those ‘undeserving’ of protection. 
This impetus to portray certain applicants as ‘external’ to the asylum system in turn 
creates laws and policies that tend to underplay the refugee or asylum seekers’ level 
of attachment to the MS and over-emphasise attachment to their country of origin.  
Underlying these policies is an assumption that many asylum seekers will not be 
recognised as refugees or beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (BSPs) under the EU 
Qualification Directive (QD) and should therefore not be afforded an opportunity to 
settle in the host state. From the perspective of host states, this only creates another 
barrier to their removal at the point that their protection application is refused.  
BSP is protection status established under the 2004 QD. Originally BSP was 
intended as a broad protection offered to a range of individuals with protection needs 
who did not precisely fit the refugee definition under Article 1 CSR. BSP status was 
ultimately restricted to those who would face ‘a real risk of suffering serious harm if 
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s/he return to the country of origin’. The QD has since been recast, but as discussed 
here, many of the main problems of the original text persist.3  
This article explores how, the ‘temporariness’ of the refugee or BSP status is also 
reinforced in the context of cessation and revocation proceedings. In recent years, 
many states have subscribed to this narrative of refugee status as revocable. The 
sense of uncertainty, linked to the possibility of revocation of status that pursues the 
refugee even after she is granted a protection status, means the distinction between 
the statuses of asylum seeker and refugee becomes less defined. The transition from 
asylum seeker to refugee does not lessen their ‘removability’  as it did in the past.  
Thus, alongside the continuum of precarity there is also a continuum of 
refugeehood, in which refugee status is redefined as increasingly fluid.  
This article looks at how the CEAS produces precariousness through a series of legal 
interventions. These interventions occur at the border, during an RSD, or even after 
the point when many would assume that they have secured a stable and long-term 
legal status. The refugee is always subject to precariousness.  
While previous literature has explored how protection is externalised or made more 
temporary, this article examines these processes as part of a broader continuum. In 
its analysis, the article focuses less on the somewhat artificial distinctions made 
between asylum seeker, failed asylum seeker, refugee, and beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection. By taking this approach, I am able to track a number of patterns and 
trends in the way that precariousness is enforced, without the limitations imposed by 
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 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection 
granted (recast QD) 
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focusing on technical categorisations. Categorisations, I argue, themselves enforce 
precariousness.  
Section 2 explores the theme of precariousness as a symptom of the continuum of 
refugeehood, which is indicative of a particular kind of governmentality that 
reinforces precariousness. Section 3 considers absolute precariousness under the 
CEAS. The possibility of deportation and the inherent risk of refoulement, reveals 
that the administration of precariousness relies as much on the threat of absolute 
precarity, as it is by its full enforcement. 
Section 4 emphasises that precarity exists on a scale or continuum. This is linked to 
how refugee status can be interpreted as temporary under a strict reading of 
cessation and revocation under the CSR. This more restrictive turn is evident from 
EU legislation, as discussed in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 brings the arguments about 
precariousness together by emphasising that they are dependent on a particular 
construction of space.  
2. Precarious Status  
2.1 The Continuum of Refugeehood and the Heft of Citizenship 
 
Under the Refugee Convention (CSR), individuals are recognised as refugees if they 
satisfy the refugee definition in Article 1.4 The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) 
emphasise that the determination process is not status conferring, but is recognition 
of a pre-existing status.5 This challenges the idea of a clear distinction between the 
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 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS (CSR). UNHCR has stated that refugee status should be considered to be declaratory in nature. See, 
UNHCR, ‘Note on Determination of Refugee Status under International Instruments’, EC/SCP/5 (UNHCR: 
1977). 
5
 UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status’, (UNHCR: 
2011) para 28. 
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status of asylum seeker and that of refugee. Indeed, the CSR never refers to ‘asylum 
seekers’.  
 ‘Asylum seeker’ was a legal category established in response to the political call for a 
distinction between those refugees who have been verified as such and those who 
have not. In the EU, the distinction was not considered a key issue until efforts were 
made to ‘harmonise’ the treatment of refugees in the 1990s.6 Since then, those 
seeking asylum are often divided into further subcategories and sub-classifications, 
usually linked to general predictions about the merits of their claims. These 
predictions are usually based on general assessments of the safety of the country 
from which they have travelled. An example of this is the lists of safe countries of 
origin drawn up at both MS and EU level.7 With these countries, asylum applications 
are usually assumed to be ‘manifestly unfounded’. The actual ‘safety’ of these 
countries is often contentious.8 
Zetter refers to this process of sub-classification as ‘bureaucratic fractioning’.9 
Bureaucratic fractioning is states’ use of classifications in order to manage the 
process and patterns of migration.10 Titles like ‘asylum seeker’ allow states to insert a 
new category under the guise of the establishing a process to determine who is a 
‘genuine’ refugee. This sort of fractioning has become so embedded that it even 
applies to the legal label of refugee itself. This is evident when, for example, refugees 
attempt to access Australia by sea and are re-directed to ‘excision zones. ’ They are 
                                                          
6
 E Guild, ‘The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy’ (2006) 18 IJRL 630, 635 
7
 See, M Hunt, ‘The Safe Country of Origin Concept in European Asylum Law: Past, Present and Future’, 
(2014) 26(4) IJRL 500-535 
8
 As Costello notes, while there is some guidance from the Recast PD on how ‘safe’ countries should be 
selected, there is little transparency surrounding the decisions to designate at both EU and MS level. See C 
Costello, ‘Safe Country? Says who?’, (2016) 28 (4) IJRL 601-622, 607.  
9
 R Zetter, ‘More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of Globalization’, (2007) 20 
(2) JRS 172-192, 174. See also, T Zartaloudis, ‘Asylum, Refugee and Immigration Law Studies: A Critical 
Supplement’ in R Islam, J H Bhulyan (eds), An Introduction to International Refugee Law (1
st
 edn, Martin 
Nijhoff 2013), 328. 
10
 Zetter, ibid 174 
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afterwards prevented from coming to mainland Australia, even if recognised as being 
in need of protection.11   
Sub-classification of status is also used by states as a way of organising refugees 
along the lines of their perceived ‘deservedness’. Those who languish in refugee 
camps hoping to be granted permission to come to the host state are portrayed as 
deserving, while those who spontaneously arrive seeking protection are viewed as 
‘queue-jumpers’.12 Similarly, those from designated safe countries of origin who 
make asylum claims are depicted as wasting resources.  
These characterisations impact on perceptions of who is a ‘real’ refugee. Malkki 
states that with the creation of a universal refugee status, a universal image of the 
typical or ‘ideal’ refugee has also emerged. This refugee is seen as a victim of her 
circumstances, someone who has little or no agency over how the spectacle and 
narrative associated with her image is used.13 This imaginary ‘ideal refugee’ not only 
affects the way that the refugee is represented in humanitarian campaigns, but also 
how refugees are characterised as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ of international 
protection.   
A crucial aspect of bureaucratic fractioning, therefore, and one which has been 
under-explored, is that it involves creating a series of more precarious legal and 
administrative statuses to better manage refugees. The enforcement of 
                                                          
11
 Australia also operates the ‘no-advantage’ policy. Refugees who arrived by sea cannot come to Australia 
ahead of refugees processed in a transit country by UNHCR. See S Pickering and L Weber, ‘New Deterrence 
Scripts in Australia’s Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers’, (2014) 39 (4) Law and 
Social Inquiry 1006-1026, 1010. 
12
 In Canada, the category of ‘designated foreign national’ was created under the Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act 2012. The status targets asylum seekers arriving to the state via maritime smuggling 
operations. The term ‘queue-jumper’ was often used in the parliamentary debates around the legislation. See, 
Canada, Parliament. House of Commons. Debates [Daily Edition], 41
st
 Parl., 1
st
 sess, March 16, 2012, p. 6415. 
13
 L H Malkki,‘Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization’, (1996) 11 (3) 
Cultural Anthropology 377-404, 386 
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precariousness allows states to monitor and police the ongoing ‘deservedness’ of the 
protection status of which the refugee avails.  
In this way, bureaucratic fractioning is one aspect of the continuum of refugeehood. 
We can best understand how this continuum functions through examining what 
Macklin describes as the heft of citizenship. For Macklin, the concept of statelessness 
is the ‘antipodal reference point for citizenship’ and statelessness is a ‘limit concept 
against which citizenship defines itself.’ 14  Yet there are many who inhabit legal 
statuses between total statelessness and full citizenship. The heft of citizenship, 
therefore, refers to the variable content of ‘citizenship’ available to those whose 
status is located somewhere between total statelessness and full citizenship.15  
An equivalent ‘heft’ exists in the continuum of refugeehood, where the refugee must 
navigate her status from the time that she arrives in the state in relation to refugee 
status. This follows her movement from applying for refugee status where she must 
prove her refugeehood, to the point that she applies for citizenship, where the 
statements made in pursuit of refugee status may be once again considered in the 
decision whether to award her citizenship.16  
While the diminished nature of protection status offered to refugees contributes to 
their precarity, this is further enforced through the possibility of that status being 
removed. This possibility is in itself used as a tool of precariousness. The desire to 
treat those who arrive by sea in a more punitive way is linked to a sense of anxiety 
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 A Macklin, ‘Who is the Citizen’s Other: Considering the Heft of Citizenship’, (2007) 8 (2) Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 333, 335 
15
 ibid, 337. Sigona notes the shifting rules about registration mean that ‘over time people move in and out of 
legal status.’ N Sigona, ‘Everyday statelessness in Italy: status, rights, and camps’ 39(2) Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 263-279, 273. 
16
 In the UK, naturalisation is dependent on the applicant satisfying the good character requirement. In The 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v SK (Sri Lanka) [2012] EWCA Civ 16, information that the 
applicant provided about his involvement in the LTTE in his asylum claim was later used as evidence of the 
absence of his good character in his naturalisation application. 
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about the hypervisibility of those seeking protection and access to the state in this 
way. Images of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in this way solidifies this sense 
of anxiety.17 
2.2 Precarity as Governmentality  
These ideas of precarity and precariousness have been most thoroughly explored by 
Butler. Butler states that the same conditions that make life possible are also those 
that make it inherently precarious. No life can be completely protected or secured 
because it is constantly exposed ‘to social and political conditions, under which life 
remains precarious.’18  Because there is no way to be totally insulated from precarity 
and precariousness, governance through precarity results in the creation of 
hierarchies of precariousness.19 Certain groups are portrayed as ‘forfeitable’, with 
their very existence portrayed as a threat to other human life.20 Butler explores this in 
relation to the ill-treatment and even killing of certain groups during times of war 
but it is also evident in reactions to groups that must move across borders.  
In Precarious Life, Butler discussed the idea of precariousness in the context of the 
US state intervention in the Middle East, as well as the arrest and detention of 
alleged terrorists. Butler draws on the Foucauldian concept of governmentality in 
order to explain this. Governmentality is described as the ‘mode of power concerned 
with the maintenance and control of bodies and person’, it operates ‘through policies 
and departments, through managerial and bureaucratic institutions, through the law, 
when the law is understood as a “set of tactics,” and through forms of state power.’21 
                                                          
17
 A Neylon, ‘Ensuring precariousness: The status of designated foreign national under the protecting Canada's 
immigration system act 2012’, (2015) 27 (2) IJRL 297 – 326, 306 
18
 I Lorey, State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious (Verso 2015) 20. 
19
 ibid. 
20
 J Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Greivable? (Verso 2006) 31. 
21
 J Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (Verso 2004), 52. 
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There is a clear line of continuity between Butler’s description of governmentality, its 
role in the proliferation of indefinite detention, and the concept of the continuum of 
precariousness. In both examples, we can observe the use of the law as a tactic, as 
well as a heavy reliance upon bureaucratic practices to legitimise the decisions of 
policies made. As a tactic, law can be suspended in order to ‘heighten the 
discretionary power of those who are asked to rely on their own judgment to decide 
fundamental matters of justice, life, and death.’22  
There are a number of direct similarities between the management of refugees and 
asylum seekers and the indefinite detention of terror subjects. The common sense of 
crisis, anxiety, and powerlessness is used to justify emergency action. In the context 
of the use of indefinite detention, Butler states that the law is either suspended or 
used to constrain and monitor a ‘given population.’23 This suspension is carried out in 
order to protect and preserve the sovereign. With the hypervisibility of refugees and 
asylum seekers arriving to the EU by sea, there emerges an ever-increasing need to 
manage and control the movement of refugees and asylum seekers. In order to more 
efficiently manage the borders as well as those who are crossing them, bureaucratic 
and administrative instruments are drawn upon. 
Similarly, the movement of refugees across borders is turned into a crisis to 
legitimise exceptional measures. While terror suspects may be subject to indefinite 
detention, asylum seekers are subject to the persistent threat of being returned to a 
third country. In both instances, states are presented with what appear to be 
impossible crises to reconcile. The response in both cases however is to suspend the 
previously accepted law, and replace it with a set of procedures that prioritise 
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 ibid, 54. 
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 ibid, 57. 
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management and security over individuals’ humanity. Bureaucracy and 
administrative practices allow the EU and EU MS to manage and control asylum 
applicants and refugees in the name of ‘efficiency’.  This fixation on efficiency speaks 
to a need to protect the immigration system above those who would avail of its 
assistance. In this way, we can see how the classification and sub-classification of 
refugee and asylum seekers responds to the ‘crisis’ of refugee movement by 
heightening the precariousness of the refugee.  
3. Protection against Refoulement: Considering the Limitations of 
Enforcing Precariousness 
Along the continuum of refugeehood, the ultimate source of precarity is the 
possibility that the host EU MS may return the asylum seeker or refugee to her 
country of origin. A state’s exercise of cessation, cancellation, or exclusion from 
refugee or another protection status puts the refugee in a position where they no 
longer have a clear legal status allowing them to remain. Once their status is 
removed, their right to remain in the state is reduced to a right not to be refouled, 
potentially linked to other human rights protections set out in the ECHR.24  
Refoulement refers to instances where a person is returned to a country where she 
would suffer persecution or a threat to her life. States within and beyond the EU have 
created a wide range of legal and political structures that allow them to avoid their 
non-refoulement responsibilities, particularly under the rubric of the STC.  
EU MS are bound to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, at international, 
ECHR and now EU level. Protection against refoulement is also provided for under, 
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 Someone who loses protection status may still be entitled to remain on the basis of their Article 8 or Article 3 
rights under the ECHR. See H Lambert, ‘“Safe Third Country” in the European Union: An Evolving Concept in 
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among other instruments, the Convention against Torture, the ICCPR, as well as the 
CSR itself and non-refoulement is often cited as part of customary international 
law.25  Despite this apparently robust framework, there remains a notable gap 
between theory and practice in the EU and MS’s observance of non-refoulement 
obligations. This is particularly connected to the manner in which the border of the 
state is manipulated using concepts like STC, and internal burden shifting 
mechanisms like the Dublin Regulation.  
There is a substantial amount of case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) asserting that the protection against refoulement is supported by Article 3 
of the ECHR, and that this protection is absolute.26  While the ECtHR rules on 
violations of the ECHR, the operation of the CEAS has led the ECtHR to rule that 
States party to the ECHR have relied on the EU Dublin Regulation in a manner 
which violates Article 3 of the ECHR.27  
The Dublin Regulation establishes which EU MS is responsible for the processing of 
an asylum application.  A number of factors determine this, including evidence of 
whether an asylum seeker has been present, legally or illegally, in another MS prior 
to lodging an asylum claim with them. Since its introduction, the Dublin Regulation 
has been criticised for prioritising the return of asylum applicants to other MS over 
the interests and rights of those seeking asylum.28 The Regulation has placed 
pressure on peripheral MS. The most prominent example of this is Greece, which 
inspired the creation of ‘EU-Turkey’ arrangement. 
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 S Taylor, ‘Australia's Safe Third Country' Provisions - Their Impact on Australia's Fulfilment of Its Non-
Refoulement Obligations’, (1996) 15. 
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 See Soering v. the UK, ECtHR, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Appl. No. 14038/88, confirming non-refoulement is 
protected under Art 3 ECHR. 
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 MSS v Belgium and Greece, [2011] ECHR 30696/09.  
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In MSS v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR found that Greece was in violation of its 
Article 3 ECHR obligations.29 This was both because of the conditions in which 
refugee applicants were being held and because of the poor quality of RSD decisions. 
The Court held Belgium was also in violation of its Article 3 obligations because it 
ought to have known that asylum applications were not being properly assessed. 
Anyone returned to Greece from Belgium under the Dublin Regulation could be 
subject to refoulement. This practice of returning people to a state where they are 
likely to be  refouled is known as chain refoulement.30 
STC concepts under the CEAS are ‘deflection activities’, which ‘turn on generalised 
assessments of safety of the state to which the asylum seeker is transferred.’31 
‘Deflection’ in this sense refers to the outsourcing of border controls. This is a tool of 
precariousness whereby the control of the border is shifted outward. In theory, a 
state that deflects responsibility must ensure that asylum seekers receive some sort 
of RSD. However, the standard of these RSDs often fall well below those accepted in 
the CEAS, such as in theEU-Turkey arrangement. These tactics underscore the ease 
with which the asylum seeker can be removed from the territory of the EU MS...All 
these measures emphasise that while the asylum seeker is under EU control, this 
does not automatically mean that she can claim rights protection under EU law or 
the ECHR. From the perspective of the MS, she is considered to be elsewhere, 
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 MSS v Belgium and Greece, above n27. 
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 ‘Chain deportation’ is used in a German case from 1993 about an Iraqi woman who had travelled to Germany 
via Turkey and Greece. See, Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, 13 September 1993, NVwz-Beilage 2 
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outside the concern of the state. As McNamara notes, the application of these 
processes creates a ‘divergence between State control and State responsibility.’32  
Gammeltoft Hansen and Hathaway point out that these deflection tactics amount to 
a new embodiment of non-entrée. Non-entrée is when states prevent refugees from 
ever reaching their jurisdiction in order to prevent them from benefitting from the 
states non-refoulement obligations.33 Previously, states employed a variety of tactics 
in order to prevent refugees from leaving their home state to enter their jurisdiction. 
These tactics included prohibitive visa policies and the re-designation of airports as 
‘international zones’, where states maintained that many international obligations 
did not apply.  
More recent policies rely on ‘cooperation-based’ approaches where politically weaker 
states are coerced to relocate potential refugee applicants. Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Hathaway call this the conscription of ‘countries of origin and of transit to effect 
migration control on behalf of the developed world.’34 
In her work on the use of islands as these sort of ‘grey zones’ Mountz refers to sites 
where ‘liminal populations’ are kept where they are ‘neither home nor arrived, not 
able to legally become refugees or asylum-seekers because … distance from sovereign 
territory.’35 The space that the refugee inhabits within the host state becomes a 
liminal zone when her protection status ceases or is revoked. While she may be 
protected from removal to her country of origin on the basis of a state’s non-
refoulement commitments, her actual legal status in the host state is reduced to a 
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 F McNamara, ‘Member State Responsibility for Migration Control within Third States – Externalisation 
Revisited’, (2013) 15 Eur J M L 319-335, 319. 
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 T Gammeltoft-Hansen and J Hathaway, ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’, (2014) 
Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper 106, 11. 
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 Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, ibid, 10 
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condition of intense precarity. She carries this liminal zone with her, at least until a 
decision is made as to whether her return is considered to be ‘safe’.  In this way, the 
construction of space, territory, geography, and how it relates to the legal status of 
the refugee, are crucial to the reinforcement of the precarious status of the refugee.  
4. Locating refugee status on the continuum of precariousness 
Refugee status does not guarantee indefinite protection. In the CSR, refugee status 
only applies until the individual is able to acquire a more permanent form of 
protection. At the same time, refugee status has often been referred to as a surrogate 
form of citizenship. 36 It is therefore is somewhere between a temporary protection 
status and a more long-term secure status akin to citizenship.  
The CSR envisages two potential long-term outcomes for the refugee. Either she 
returns to her country of origin once the persecution she fled has subsided, or she 
assimilates to the country of asylum and naturalises there.37 Recent trends in states 
both within and beyond EU indicate they favour the former scenario. Many states 
now view cessation and revocation of protection status as a convenient form of post-
hoc immigration control. 
In general, cessation describes the process by which refugee status comes to an end 
because it has been demonstrated that the need for protection has abated. As 
UNHCR has stated, the content of article 1C expresses ‘the consideration that 
international protection should not be granted where it is no longer necessary or 
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 See for example, Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 3 All ER 577, 580-81 and 
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justified.’38 UNHCR however also states that cessation provisions ‘should be 
interpreted ‘restrictively’39 or ‘strictly’.40  
Article 1C establishes the conditions under which a refugee under which cessation 
will take place. Article 1C (1-4) refers to cessation where the refugee acts to indicate 
that she no longer needs the protection of the host state. Article 1C (1) refers to 
situations where the refugee voluntarily re-avails of the protection of her country of 
nationality, Article 1C (2) refers to when the refugee voluntarily re-acquires her 
nationality, having previously lost it. Article 1C (3) states refugee status may be 
deemed ceased where the refugee has acquired the nationality of a new country. 
Article 1C (4) refers to the cessation when the refugee has voluntarily re-established 
herself in her country of origin. Articles 1 C (5) and (6) refer to cessation on the basis 
of a change in circumstances in the country of origin, where the conditions that 
caused the refugee to leave have ceased to exist. 
Cessation determinations should only be applied after careful interrogation as to 
whether the alleged cessation is sustained and meaningful. Since a refugee is 
awarded her status on an individual basis, cessation should also be individually 
pursued. Mass-cessations therefore do not adequately scrutinise the effect of 
returning all those individuals.  While an assessment of the general standard of 
human rights in the country of origin should be carried out before cessation, the 
country of asylum must also consider whether the fear of persecution that caused the 
individual refugee to flee continues to exist. UNHCR Guidelines on cessation state 
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 UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
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that the change in circumstances must be fundamental, durable, and result in 
effective protection being available in the country of origin.41   
Cessation of refugee status is distinct from cancellation and exclusion from refugee 
status. Cancellation is the removal of status because the status was obtained 
fraudulently.42 Cancellation implies that refugee status never existed in the first 
place. While there is no direct reference to cancellation in the CSR, it has been read 
into the text by UNCHR as well as States Party to CSR.43 
Exclusion from refugee status occurs because of actions taken by the refugee that 
indicate that she is not deserving of refugee status.44 Article 1F CSR sets out the 
exclusion provisions. These provisions apply to the refugee at the point that she first 
seeks the protection of the CSR. Article 1F specifically refers to an applicant’s 
involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity. As Hathaway points out, 
Article 1F prevents the inclusion of refugees who would threaten ‘the integrity of the 
international refugee regime’.45 The standard for exclusion based on Article 1F should 
therefore be set quite high. As discussed here however, the formulation of the QD 
which incorporates the CSR into EU law, undermines the idea that exclusion only 
applies prior to any RSD. Revocation of refugee status is also linked to the content of 
Article 1F.46 The key difference between exclusion and revocation is that exclusion 
applies prior to the RSD and revocation applies at some point after the RSD.  
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The QD however refers to the ‘revocation’ of both refugee and subsidiary protection 
status for a much broader range of reasons than those linked to Article 1F. This 
encourages MS to assume a logic of exclusion from the outset, and to proactively 
apply revocation of protection to a range of circumstances they may not have in the 
past. The broader definition of revocation under the QD indicates a narrative of 
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ refugees, that goes well beyond that set out in the CSR. 
5. Cessation, Exclusion, and Cancellation Under the Qualification 
Directive 
Cessation, exclusion and cancellation are specific and separate categories in the CSR. 
The QD departs from this, using ‘revocation’ as a catch-all term, applied to different 
kinds of status removal. At the same time, the QD also differentiates between 
refugees and BSPs, with BSPs subject to a greater degree of precariousness.  
5.1. Normalising the removability of protection statuses 
While the CSR sets out provisions for the removal of status, the decision to enforce 
these provisions is left to the discretion of the state. Under the QD however, removal 
of refugee and BSP statuses is not only incorporated into a broader range of 
provisions, but is compulsory in certain contexts. These provisions underline the 
precariousness of the refugee and the BSP, even after the granting of protection 
status.  
Owing to how states record statistics in relation to asylum and refugee status, it is 
difficult to identify whether there has been a significant rise in the number of 
revocations and cessations since the introduction of the QD.47 However, a number of 
examples from Germany raise questions about how MS view the cessation and 
                                                          
47
 These figures are not published with other asylum statistics. See UNHCR, ibid, 3.  
19 
 
revocation of protection statuses. ECRE estimate that between 2003 and 2008, the 
refugee status of about 18,000 Iraqis in Germany was removed due to Germany’s 
cessation policy.48  
The German authorities asserted that the change in circumstances was durable and 
fundamental because the Hussein regime had been removed.49 They did not take 
account of on-going instability in the region and ‘general issues of safety, other than 
the likelihood of renewed persecution, had not been taken into account at all.’50   
The German Federal Administrative Court subsequently referred questions relating 
to the application of the cessation and revocation provisions to the CJEU.51 In 
Abdulla & Others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the Grand Chamber rejected the 
argument that a refugee’s status could cease without taking account of additional 
circumstances affecting the individual upon return. While the Grand Chamber 
determined that Germany had applied the concept of cessation too narrowly, it also 
stated cessation could be allowed where protection could be accessed from a non-
State Party actor in the country of origin. This aspect of the judgment has been 
heavily criticised.52 
Arguably, in the above example the state interpreted refugee status as a context 
specific legal status that must inevitably end. This use of cessation reveals the 
preoccupation that the German state had with the sustained management and 
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control of refugee bodies, beyond the point at which they have been formally 
recognised as refugees by the state.  
Such post-hoc management of refugee arrivals has occurred in Germany previously. 
Following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, Germany only granted many 
of those seeking protection a sub-refugee status known as ‘duldung’.  These 
protection statuses were created on an ad hoc basis, existing for as long as the 
conflicts that caused the refugees to flee lasted.53  
Sardelic points out that this, as well as other statuses in Austria, influenced the 
development of the EU Temporary Protection Directive (TPD).54 While the TPD was 
never invoked by the EU Council, it remains available to MS following the arrival of 
large numbers fleeing a conflict. The legislation provides for an immediate temporary 
protection status in lieu of the usual RSD. TPD status is differentiated from the 
refugee or BSP statuses in the QD because it only exists for a maximum period of two 
years and thereafter cannot be renewed. TPD statuses may also collectively come to 
an end at any time if a Council decision is adopted to that effect.55 Examining the use 
of ad hoc temporary statuses by Germany in the post-Yugoslav context and the 
implementation of cessation provisions against Iraqi refugees in 2008, it is clear that 
there is an enduring tendency towards enforcing temporariness and precariousness 
en masse.  
This illustrates a persistent view that a refugee’s ongoing right to remain in the state 
of asylum must be constantly interrogated. In certain emergency scenarios, 
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temporary protection must be granted for practical reasons. However, the 2008 
example indicates a shift, where full refugee status is removed en masse in a manner 
more like the TPD than the content of the CSR, on which the QD is based. The mass-
application of cessation in 2008 therefore opened up the possibility for refugee 
status to assume the characteristics of a temporary protection status, without a 
temporary protection status being formally introduced into law.   
 5.2 The language of removability of protection status in the QD  
Article 11(1)(e) QD establishes the ceased circumstances provisions under EU law, 
which mirror Article 1C(5) CSR. Unlike the CSR, MS are then bound under Article 14 
QD to ‘revoke’ refugee status if there is a ceased circumstances determination.  
Under Article 14, the MS must revoke the protection status of those who fall into 
certain categories. Framing revocation this way indicates pressure to pursue removal 
of protection statuses where previously they may have refrained from doing so under 
the terms of the CSR. 
The ‘revocation provisions’ - Articles 14 and 19 QD (which applies to BSP) - oblige an 
MS to revoke the refugee status of a refugee or BSP whose status is deemed to have 
ceased under Articles 11 and 16 QD (cessation of BSP. Articles 14 and 19 therefore 
provide for the enforcement of the cessation grounds established in Articles 11 and 
16. Under Article 11(2) and Article 16(2) QD, MS must confirm that the change in 
circumstance in the country of origin was ‘of such a significant and non-temporary 
nature’ that the refugee or BSP’s fear of persecution ‘can no longer be regarded as 
well-founded.’ The QD establishes an obligation to revoke the status of BSPs and 
refugees in these circumstances. An MS that might not have pursued cessation of 
refugee or BSP status is now bound to do so. By phrasing revocation of status as a 
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mandate, greater emphasis is placed on the removal of status than on the actual 
safety of a possible return.   
An EU Parliament report highlights the negative effect of this framing, arguing that it 
‘results in incorrect practical application of cessation thereby prematurely denying 
protection to persons who continue to be in need of it.’56 Further, the report notes in 
some cases MS do not establish whether the risk of persecution has ceased on an 
individual basis.57  
Revocation provisions in the QD also extend the scope of exclusion provisions. Under 
the QD, exclusion from refugee or BSP status can occur both prior to and after 
protection status is granted.  
6 The QD and the BSP: ‘Deservedness’ and developing a bureaucratic 
approach to exclusion  
Articles 12 and 17 QD are exclusion clauses. Like Article 1F CSR, Article 12(2) QD 
excludes someone from refugee protection if they are found to have committed a 
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as defined in the 
international instruments.58 Article 12 (2) (b) also excludes those who have 
committed a serious or non-political crime outside the country of asylum before 
being recognised as a refugee. Article 12(b) however significantly extends the 
temporal scope of the exclusion clauses in the CSR, covering crimes committed in the 
state of asylum prior to lodging a protection application. Article 12(2)(b) then goes 
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on to state that ‘particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly 
political objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes.’  
Guild and Garlick state that the term ‘particularly cruel actions’ dramatically widens 
‘what acts could be seen to constitute “serious non-political crimes”’.59 Also, because 
there is no definition of what ‘particularly cruel actions’ involve, there is potential for 
subjective, arbitrary, and inconsistent interpretation of this provision.60 Article 12(3) 
stipulates that those excluded on the basis of Article 12(2) includes those who carry 
out acts, or those who incite the carrying out of such acts – extending the scope of the 
provision even further.    
As noted above, Article 17 QD sets out the grounds for exclusion from BSP status, but 
extends the temporal scope of the exclusion clauses beyond what is expressed for 
refugees in the CSR, applying even after status has been granted. The QD therefore 
takes a provision originally intended to divert undeserving applicants from the RSD 
process, and creates another ground for the revocation of an existing protection 
status.   
Article 17 reiterates the grounds for exclusion for BSPs on the basis of international 
crimes as well as exclusion on the basis of acts contrary to the UN Charter that are 
also referred to Article 12 (for refugees).61 Under Article 19, MS are however obliged 
to revoke BSP status, where Article 17 applies. To put this in context, if a recognised 
refugee is convicted of a serious crime in the MS of asylum, under the QD, that MS 
has discretion as to whether it will remove her refugee status. However, if a BSP 
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commits a crime of equivalent gravity, the MS must revoke the BSP’s protection 
status. 
Article 17(1)(d) QD states that a person is excluded from BSP status if she ‘constitutes 
a danger to the community or to the security of the Member State in which he or she 
is present.’ She is also excluded from the protection of the QD if she has committed a 
serious crime (Article 17 (1)(b)) – echoing Article 33(2) CSR. Article 33(2) limits the 
extent of States Parties’ non-refoulement obligation under the CSR. Article 33(2) 
permits the state to refoul a recognised refugee, in to whom:  
… there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country. 
Article 19 allows for the revocation of BSP status for reasons relating to the security 
of the state, as well as the BSP’s deservedness of protection status. Similar to the 
application of Article 33(2) CSR, the QD does not require the MS to establish that if 
returned to her country of origin the former BSP will face serious harm.62 However, 
while Article 33(2) does not require the removal of the protection status, Article 19 
does, maintaining the BSP status as a particularly precarious under EU law.  
The particular vulnerability of BSP status to removal in the context of the ‘security’ 
exclusions has been confirmed in MS courts. For example,in a 2010 decision by the 
Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) in Belgium, the CALL had to decide whether 
a BSP could benefit from more favourable rules on the revocation of protection 
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status, or whether the terms of Article 19 QD were mandatory. 63  The applicant had 
been convicted of heroin trafficking and imprisoned for 30 months. Following this 
conviction, the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless 
Persons (CGRS) revoked his BSP status. The applicant asserted that the relevant 
provision of the Alien’s Act was more favourable than the QD, and that MS were 
entitled to use this reading, even after the introduction of the Directive. This position 
was supported by UNHCR.64  
The CALL did not accept this argument. They maintained that Article 17(1) and (2) 
and Article 19(3)(a) and (b) were framed in mandatory terms. In order to support 
this position, the CALL referred to the preparatory documents of the Belgian 
legislator at the time that the QD was drafted. The CALL noted that at this time, the 
Belgian legislator had supported the contention that the provisions should be applied 
mandatorily.  
The outcome of this judgment is striking considering a similar decision from 
Germany made around the same time.65 The German case concerned the equivalent 
provisions, as applied to someone with refugee status. Like the Belgian case, the 
German case concerned a person who had previously acquired protection status and 
was now facing revocation of that status because of crimes carried out in the state of 
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asylum. The High Administrative Court of Niedersachsen had to consider whether a 
conviction the applicant had received as a juvenile could be used as grounds to 
revoke refugee status as an adult. The court held that the corresponding provisions of 
the QD, Articles 14(4) and 14(5), were optional provisions.  
These decisions reveal the troubling divergence in treatment between BSPs and 
refugees under the QD. While one may claim that there is a distinction between the 
revocation of BSP status for a drug conviction with a 30 month prison sentence and a 
conviction received while a juvenile, this is not the central concern. The most 
pressing point is that the courts are afforded the discretion to determine whether to 
revoke protection status of a refugee but not when they consider the fate of a BSP.66   
This distinction between BSPs and refugees underscores the influence of 
bureaucratic fractioning on the management of asylum seekers and refugees in the 
EU. The comparable precariousness of BSPs’ legal status reinforces their position as 
one that is even more loseable than refugee status. The QD goes to particular lengths 
to ensure that the distinction in treatment between the BSP and refugee are not only 
maintained, but emphasised.  This is particularly ironic since, when the Recast QD 
was proposed, a key goal was to ensure that BSP status would not be a preferred or 
superior status, but one which would cater to a different purpose, under the umbrella 
of ‘international protection status’. In practice, BSP’s are treated as less deserving 
refugees, and thus subject to greater managerial intrusion. 
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7. Taking precarious legal status to its limit? The Procedures 
Directive. 
The processes related to the management and removal of status are rooted in a 
particular ‘spatial imaginary’. At their core, the refugee is imagined ‘elsewhere’ - 
whether that be at ‘home’ in the country of origin, or in a STC. This ‘safety elsewhere’ 
reasserts the precariousness of asylum seekers’ legal status at the border, but also 
while they await their RSD. All of these processes overlap to form a powerful 
management apparatus. This is clearest in the Procedures Directive (PD), where the 
threat of cessation is used to prevent the entry of the asylum seeker.                       
Established in 2005, the PD was originally intended to create minimum standards 
for procedures on ‘granting or withdrawing refugee status’. By establishing 
‘minimum standards’, the PD predictably sparked a race to the bottom. It was also 
criticised for normalising exceptional measures like safe countries of origins and 
STC.67 The PD has since been revised68 and includes a number of positive changes.69 
In general however, the recast PD entrenches the key problems with the original 
directive, with STC and safe countries of also remaining key features. Some argue 
that these concepts have now become almost mandatory.70    
New provisions in the recast PD also establish an even more precarious legal status 
under the CEAS, by drawing on the idea of ‘safety elsewhere’ and principles 
associated with cessation.   
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Under Article 31(4) of the recast PD, MS may prevent refugee and BSP applicants 
from receiving a status determination procedure if they believe that the 
circumstances that caused the applicant to flee her country of origin are temporary. 
Article 31(4) stipulates that MS must review the supposed temporary nature of the 
circumstances every six months. While there is no explicit reference to a time limit 
specifying how long the MS is permitted to maintain the refugee in this 
indeterminate status, under Article 31(5) all status determinations must be 
concluded in 21 months.  
Importantly, Article 31(4) signifies the first overt support by the EU of the 
application of cessation criteria prior to the application of inclusion clauses, contrary 
to the intended purpose of the Article 1C(5) CSR.  
Someone targeted under Article 31(4) PD may well have a valid claim to refugee or 
subsidiary protection status. They are however precluded from making such a claim. 
It is clear that the provision is another tool to manage the entry of protection 
applicants into the EU. By fusing determination and cessation procedures, Article 
31(4) reinforces temporariness as a means of reducing the overall number of 
protection status applicants, regardless of need.  
UNHCR has stated that, RSD and ‘cessation procedures should be seen as separate 
and distinct processes.’71 This distinction is important to ensure states do not use 
cessation as a way to avoid their responsibilities. This is exactly the risk with Article 
31 (4) PD. The applicant is not turned away at the border, but she is not formally 
recognised as a protection applicant either. She inhabits a sort of limbo, as a sub-
category along the continuum of precariousness. 
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7.1 Deconstructing Spatial Narratives through the Application of Law 
Earlier in the article I highlighted how important physical presence in a MS is for 
those seeking protection to access basic rights protections, including non-
refoulement. Article 31(4) recast PD demonstrates a key disjuncture between 
physical presence in a MS and whether that presence is recognised under law. Under 
Article 31(4), the applicant’s connection to the host state is presented as tenuous, 
while her connection to the country from which she has fled is emphasised. From the 
perspective of the MS, the applicant never truly inhabits its territory. The focus is on 
outward connections to another space.72  
We can see other examples of being untethered to place. Mezzadra and Neilson 
discuss a protest where the slogan ‘né qui né altrove’ was used.73 The slogan 
translates as ‘neither here, nor elsewhere’.74 Neilson notes that this aptly describes 
the constant re-location that the asylum applicant faces when subject to STC 
procedures.75 Similarly, it conveys the indeterminacy faced by those subject to Article 
31(4) recast PD.  
Article 31(4) draws our attention to the concept of ‘spatial responsibility’. Spatial 
responsibility speaks to the idea that those who experience suffering in a 
geographically remote location are considered ‘distant strangers’.76 The tools of 
externalisation allow the MS to disconnect from the asylum seeker who is 
territorially present in the state. This is achieved by legally re-establishing her in 
either her country of origin or to the STC that the MS wishes to send her. Even 
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though she may be physically present in the MS, the state makes a series of 
representations that situate her place of true belonging elsewhere.  
Puumala and Pehkonen, quoting Jean-Luc Nancy, have stated that ‘the body without 
asylum is always “about to leave, on the verge of movement, a fall, a gap, a 
dislocation.”’77 This is particularly true of the applicant subject to Article 31(4) who 
faces a unique level of uncertainty. In her movement across the border to a MS, her 
body has been politicised in a different way to those with access to asylum 
procedures. From the perspective of the state, not only is her identity inscribed with 
the circumstances that caused her to flee their country of origin, her legal status is 
also dependent on those circumstances’ perceived permanence. 
Borders and places of detention are often described as sites where categories of 
exclusion may be dispensed.78  However, Article 31(4) recast PD demonstrates 
another way bodies may be ordered on the basis of geopolitical concerns. Article 
31(4) reveals that territorial ambiguity may be ascribed not just to a place within a 
border, but also to a body within a border. Those designated under Article 31(4) are 
situated at the limits of identifiable categories. They are neither fully present in the 
state of asylum nor fully absent from their country of origin.  
Maintaining people in this interim state is not an unintentional side effect of the 
legislation. It is a deliberate tactic of precarity. Article 31(4) of the PD is merely 
symptomatic of the broader trends set out in this article - indicative of the 
increasingly creative ways in which the border is constructed and solidified around 
the refugee and the protection applicant.   
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8. Conclusion 
To return to the EU-Turkey statement, we can see that far from an aberration, it is 
another clear example of the institutionalisation of safety elsewhere, which further 
reinforces the precarity of refugee status.  At the same time, the form of the 
agreement represents a newer type of shifting responsibility.  
The EU-Turkey statement has been subject to a number of legal challenges disputing 
its validity. The central argument was that the statement exposes asylum seekers to 
the risk of chain refoulement.79 Emphasising this issue, the applicants pointed out 
that as far as the ECtHR is concerned, Greece does not provide an adequate asylum 
assessment. Decisions made about the return of individuals to Turkey from Greece 
therefore cannot be guaranteed to be safe.  
However, when the General Court made a declaration on the cases, the issues raised 
by the applicants were not actually addressed. Rather, the Court stated that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the case. The Court stated that the EU press release 
describing the deal in March 2016 was inaccurate since the arrangement was not 
between the EU and Turkey, but rather between individual MS and Turkey. 
Accordingly, the Court determined it did not have jurisdiction under Article 263 
TFEU.  
The outcome of this case draws our attention again to Butler’s discussion of the 
suspension of law as a tactic to produce precarity. By denying it has jurisdiction, the 
Court suspends the application of EU law. This is despite the fact that until this 
point, EU institutions appeared to be directly involved in the arrangement.  
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It is interesting to see how the EU selectively invokes the idea of the sovereign state, 
independent of the EU, when it suits the particular narrative that it is trying to 
advance at any particular moment. This further emphasises the unpredictability of 
EU law from the perspective of the precarious. It is clear that when the applicants try 
to use EU law in order to demand certain rights, the issues that they complain of are 
no longer accepted as the law, but as individual discretionary decisions of certain MS.  
This article has highlighted the various ways that MS have used jurisdictional 
questions as a means of deflecting responsibility for the protection of asylum seekers, 
refugees, and BSPs. The EU-Turkey statement is itself a deflection technique, but so 
is the EU’s refusal to accept responsibility for the arrangement.  With the decision of 
the General Court in relation to the arrangement, responsibility for it has been given 
to MS, who themselves have structures in place to avoid responsibility. It is clear that 
the shifting of responsibility between MS and the EU is circular, persistent, and 
ultimately quite difficult to predict. What is certain from these shifts is that 
vulnerable groups like asylum seekers and refugees are maintained in a state of 
precariousness.     
In this article, I described how the refugee and the BSP’s legal statuses exist along a 
continuum of precariousness. This precariousness is enforced by framing refugee 
and BSP as statuses that could at any point be rescinded, taken away. This article has 
examined tools used to ensure the insecurity of status along the continuum of 
precariousness. The refugee or BSP’s claim to rights linked to her presence in the 
state of asylum is problematized. The possibility that she may be returned to her 
country of origin is often over-emphasised.  
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This is achieved through a number of devices – for example, by over-stating the level 
of attachment that the refugee has to her country of origin and by drawing on 
concepts like cessation to use the law to re-position the refugee in her country of 
origin. Controlling the bodies of refugees is a key concern of both MS and the EU. By 
constantly re-establishing the precarity of the refugee and the BSP, the state can 
reassert a level of control that it feels it has lost.  
The way in which refugees and BSPs are subjected to the removal of their protection 
status is often an administrative exercise. The bureaucratic nature of revocation or 
cessation tends to absolve the MS of a sense of responsibility. Given that removal of 
these statuses is formulated as an efficient method to apply post-hoc immigration 
control measures, the implications that these processes have on individuals and the 
risks that they open them to become lost in the machinery of the process. As shown 
here however, this idea of administrative efficiency is not only limited to the 
processes applied to the removal of refugee and BSP status, it goes to the heart of the 
CEAS itself, the obligation of non-refoulement.  
The EU-Turkey arrangement is not therefore a radical departure from the existing 
practices under the CEAS. It is merely another way in which the EU draws on the 
idea of uncertainty and precariousness as a tool of management and control. It 
draws upon a well-established policy of pushing EU borders outwards, in a way that 
actually absolves MS of any responsibility to those seeking protection.   
Therefore, while one could make policy recommendations with respect to, for 
example, a greater parity of treatment between refugees and BSPs, or a more robust 
framework to prevent excessive use of revocation powers, such recommendations 
will always fall short. The way in which categories of asylum and refugeehood are 
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organised and justified under the CEAS will always provide the opportunity to avoid 
responsibility to those in need of protection when there is a perceived overriding 
political incentive to do so.   
Enforcing precariousness is therefore the key tool used by the EU and MS to 
‘manage’ refugee movements and it will continue to be for the foreseeable future. 
